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COMMENTARY

The Role of Judges
in Life/Death Decisions for the
Neurologically Impaired
H. Richard Beresford, MD, JD
The Massachusetts supreme court has recently ruled that decisions about withholding care from hopelessly ill,
legally incapacitated patients must be m a d e b y judges. I t clearly rejected the view t h a t families a n d attending
physicians should be empowered to m a k e s u c h decisions. In this respect, the r u l i n g contrasts with that of the
Qlriulan case and highlights the issue of whether judges or physicians and families are better able to make medically
and morally sound decisions respecting this class o f patients.
Beresford H R T h e role of judges in life/death decisions for the neurologically impaired.
Ann Neurol 4:463-464,1978

The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court recently ruled
that judges have thc final authority to make life/death decisions for legally incompetent patients [a]. The ruling has
greatly perturbed the Massachusetts medical community
because i t seems t o bar attending physicians and families
from agreeing among themselves to withhold care from
hopelessly ill persons who arc legally incapacitated [2, 71.
The ruling contrasts with that of the Quinlun casc, in which
the New Jersey supreme court empowered family, attending physicians, and a hospital "ethics committcc" to act
jointly to remove a respirator from a severely braindamage(/ adult [ 5 1. Both courts agreed, however. that it is
lawful to withhold therapy from hopelessly ill patients if
the treatments promise nothing more than to prolong a
noncognirive or minimally cognitive existence.

T h e Saikewicz Case
Thc focus of decision i n the Massachusetts case was Joseph
Saikewicz, a profoundly retarded (IQ. 10; mental age. 2%
years) G9-year-old man who had spent most of his life in
state institutions. When he developed acute leukemia in
1976, his attending physicians recommended against chemotherapy. But because he was incapable of participating
in decisions about his care, the confining institution asked a
probate judgc to appoint a Ruardian t o act for him. When
notified of the situation, his two sisters declined to participate in the guardianship hearing o r t o assume any role in
his care. A bwardian was then appointed and promptly recommended that Saikewicz not bc treated becausc he had an
incurable illness for which treatment offered little prospect
of benefit and was likely to cause great discomfort.
The probate judge ordcrccf thar chemothcrapv be withheld, although hc conceded that it might prolong life and
that most cornpetcnt and informed persons with analogous
leukemias elect t o receive it. He considercd that the paFrom thc Dcpartmcnts of Neurology, North Shore University
Hospital. Manhassct* and Cornell University
Coilege,
Ncw Yt)rk. NY.

tient's age, his inability to cooperate in treatment. the
likelihood of distressing side-effects, the low probability of
remission, and the dubious quality of life if remission were
obtained outweighed any possible therapeutic benefits.
T h e judge then asked the state supreme court t o determine
if a probate court has general authority to issue such an
order and if the order in the instant case was correct. The
high court answered both questions affirmatively but withheld its written opinion for over a year. In the interval,
Saikewicz died of pneumonia, having received no trcatment for his leukemia.
T h e belated written opinion of the Massachusetts supreme court reasons that because legally competent persons have a constitutional right to refuse medical care, incompctents should be accorded a similar right. Although
incompetents have no decision-making power, the doctrine
of substituted judgment enables lawfully appointed guardians and judges to act on their behalf. The guardian's role is
to try to ascertain the incompetent's preferences; but, if
these preferences arc unknowable, the guardian should Jetermine what choice a reasonable person in the incompetent's situation would make. In the court's view, the mcdical evidence supported the guardian's conclusion that a reasonable person in Saikcwicz's position would decline
treatment. It cautioned, however. that its ruling should not
be read as a devaluation of Saikcwicz's life, even though his
impaired cognition was a factor in weighing the rcasonableness of treatment.
Having concluded that withholding life-prolonging care
may be appropriate in some cases, the court prescribed a
judicially oriented procedure for making decisions. Thus, in
the event a question arises as to whether to withhold care
from an incompetent person, a petition must be filcd with a
probate court for appointment of a guardian. Once appointed, the guardian must make a thorough investlgation
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and present to the court “all reasonable arguments in favor
of administering treatment to prolong the life of the individual involved” 191. T h e c o u n then decides whether
treatment shall be administered or withheld. In reaching its
decision, the court may avail itself of the opinions of medical experts or “ethics committees,” but it is not required
either to seek or to follow such advice. To emphasize that
the power of decision rests firmly with the probate judge,
the state supreme court noted that it takes “a dim view of
any attempt to shift the ultimate decision-making responsibility away from the duly established courts . . . to any
committee, panel or group, ad hoc or permanent” 191.

Considerat ions
The court’s ruling raises several challenging questions, but
perhaps the most immediate is this: Does the court really
mean that probate judges must make all decisions about all
life-prolonging care for all hopelessly ill incompetents, be
they brain-damaged or minors? If so, one can anticipate a
sharp expansion of the dockets of probate courts in Massachusetts and a contraction of the activities of hospital committees [ 6 ]established to assist in decisions about care of
the hopelessly ill. As noted by Dr Relman [7],the number
of cases potentially subject to the court‘s ruling is not inconsiderable, and only a well-staffed, medically sophisticated, highly efficient probate court system could effectively handle them. If the Massachusetts supreme court
envisions a narrower scope for its ruling, then at some
future time it will need to spell out more precisely when
the jurisdiction of the probate court must be invoked. In
the meantime, Massachusetts physicians and families must
either go to c o u n if they wish to withhold care from
hopelessly ill and legally disabled patients, or else quietly
evade the mandate of the court’s decision and risk civil or
criminal liability.
As with the Quinkan decision, the impact of Saiknvirz in
other states is unpredictable. A striking aspect of the
Saiknuin opinion is the court’s distrust o f private
decision-making by attending physicians and families,
whether or not it is buttressed by the opinion of an “ethics
committee.” Why the court thinks that judges are more
likely to make correct decisions than those most intimately
concerned with an ill person does not clearly emerge from
its opinion. Perhaps it believes that judges have more refined ethical sensitivities than physicians, or that families
may have nonaltruistic motives for withholding treatment
from a hopelessly ill person. The “gravitational effect” [3]
of Saikewirz may therefore depend on how lawmakers
elsewhere weigh the comparative abilities of judges, on the
one hand, and physicians and families, on the other, to
arrive at medically and morally defensible decisions. As
Professor Goldstein has suggested, because no objectively
right o r wrong answer exists in these cases, there is no
compelling reason to prefer judicial decisions to private
agreements [4].

Both Quinlan and Saikewin assume a societal consensus
about the rightness of allowing some hopelessly ill persons
to die. Where they differ is in the choice of decision-maker.
Quinhn would leave the decision to family, physicians, and
a committee; Saiknvin places the responsibility on a probate judge. Other alternatives are to make physicians the
primary decision-makers, to allow physicians and families
to decide without the intervention of a committee o r a
court, or to allow families alone to decide once they have
received an unequivocally hopeless prognosis from an attending physician. If the Qainlan and Saiknvicz courts accurately interpret the public will, it would be unthinkable
to issue a blanket prohibition against withholding p r e s u m p
tively futile treatments from the legally disabled.
Because more litigation about withholding care from the
hopelessly ill is likely, legislation may be helpful [I]. Such
legislation might specify the types of cases in which withholding care may be considered and establish a procedure
for decision-making. It could identify the decision-makers.
define the role of comminees or panels. and provide for
access to the courts in the event that a prescribed procedure fails to produce agreement o n the level of care. If the
legislation permits private decision-making, it could
explicitly protect the participants from any civil or criminal
liability.
The alternative to legislation is more judge-made law. If
Saikewin is any portent. the trend may be to increase the
role of judges in specific decisions about levels of medical
care. If this pattern indeed develops, one would hope for
judges who are both skilled evaluators of medical data and
good moral philosophers. O n e would also hope that they
are capable of exercising these talents in situations which
call for very prompt decisions. But even if such judges are
abundant, the question will remain why they are better
suited to decide when to stop medical care for the
hopelessly ill than persons who are more knowledgeable
about prognosis or more passionately involved in the ill
person’s fate.
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